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Introduction 
Many researchers who have gravitated towards Discursive Psychology can 
produce very vivid accounts of when exactly it was that they ‘lost their faith’ in 
cognitive-experimental psychology. For one of us, it was during a lecture at the 
University of Reading, listening to an eminent psychologist describe the 
relationship of cognitive architecture to the brain using the well known 
metaphor of software running on hardware. Perhaps the metaphor was striking 
and innovative when it was freshly minted. But by the late 1980s, it seemed quite 
impoverished. Is that it? Is that what the rich contours of human experience 
come down to? Could it really be so simple? 
Edwards and Potter’s (1992) critique of ‘truth’ in cognitive-experimental 
approaches to memory and their alternative formulation of a discursive 
treatment of remembering, arrived at a fortuitous moment. Rather like the 
embattled Conservative government of the time, whose Chancellor, Nigel 
Lawson, is one of the central figures of the piece, so it felt that the dominant 
regime – the dreaded cognitivists – were losing their grip on the discipline. A 
new intellectual force was emerging, not from the heartlands of power, but from 
highly unlikely places such as Manchester, Milton Keynes, and most surprising of 
all, Loughborough. Change was coming. 
Or at least that is how things felt, in the early 1990s. In what follows we will try 
to describe exactly why The Chancellor’s Memory offered such a rewarding 
challenge to theoretical and methodological sensibilities, one that continues to 
shape and inform our own work today. But we will also try to make clear how 
that piece formalized the terms of engagement with cognitive-experimental 
psychology in a way that has ultimately been highly unproductive. We can see in 
this early work the effort to elevate discourse and conversation analysis beyond 
the status of mere methodology to the foundations for a new form of Psychology 
itself. And it is here that the Loughborough approach came to be somewhat 
peculiarly modeled on the regime it sought to supplant, the Blairist New Labour 
to the Thatcherism of cognitive-experimental psychology, if you like. The 
challenges of working through this difficult legacy will be one of our major 
themes. 
Context 
Critical (Social) Psychology in the 1980s had reached something of an impasse. 
The classic early works of authors like Ken Gergen, Rom Harré and John Shotter 
had performed extensive diagnosis of just what was wrong with the discipline, 
but they were less than illuminating as to what would need to be done to create a 
viable alternative. As Brown and Locke put it: 
The key texts of the crisis literature had all called for change in social 
psychology. To some extent ‘experiments’ became seen as emblematic of 
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all that was wrong with the discipline. The search for new methods then 
became at the same time shorthand for doing social psychology 
differently. However, the majority of the crisis literature proved to be 
very thin in terms of specific recommendations for appropriate 
methodologies. This left a generation of researchers in the unfortunate 
position of being ‘against’ experiments but with little sense of the 
alternatives (i.e. what they were actually ‘for’). (Brown & Locke, 2010: 
376) 
 
It was in this very particular context that a ‘turn to language’ became so 
appealing. Mick Billig’s (1987) work on rhetoric and Jeff Coulter’s (1979) 
application of ethnomethodology had both been instrumental in nudging debates 
about the problem of imputing mental states away from philosophical discussion 
and towards the issue of methods. We can see this clearly in Derek Edwards’s 
work in the 1980s. Edwards & Goodwin (1985) argue that lexical development in 
children is poorly grasped when it is treated in terms of gradual conceptual 
understanding, because this implies that ‘thinking’ precedes ‘doing’. However, by 
looking at ‘real world’ instances of children’s social interactions, it is clear that 
language is deployed pragmatically by the child to ‘do things’ before its 
referential function can be said to be established. This leads, in Edwards & 
Mercer (1987), to a concern with how the language of instruction in a classroom 
setting can construct understanding as a shared, communicative 
accomplishment.  
 
Dave Middleton’s early work shared this concern with the linguistic steering of 
children’s activities, having been part of the group that refined the experimental 
demonstration of ‘scaffolding’ in parent-child interactions (see Woods & 
Middleton, 1975; Woods, Bruner & Ross, 1975). These studies were critical to a 
move in developmental psychology of placing cognitive development in a socio-
cultural context. Together, Edwards & Middleton took these varied ingredients of 
pragmatics, communicative settings, interaction and ‘thinking through doing’, 
and applied them to the study of memory. Why exactly it is that they chose to 
focus on memory, rather than any of the other key topic areas of either 
developmental or social psychology, is a little unclear. There appears to be a 
certain arbitrariness here, much as there is with Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) 
treatment of attribution theory or Potter & Litton’s (1985) engagement with 
social representations, where the point of the exercise is deconstruct ‘traditional’ 
approaches by showing the viability of a rhetorical and discursive alternative, 
rather than a sustained effort to move the topic on per se (see also Edwards et al, 
1992: 445). To this end, Edwards & Middleton conducted a series of studies 
using both quasi-experimental methods (the ‘E.T.’ study – Edwards & Middleton, 
1986) and semi-naturalistic data collection (the family photographs study – 
Edwards & Middleton, 1988). These studies generated transcribed interactional 
material that Edwards & Middleton analysed to show how versions of past 
events were jointly negotiated in an argumentative context using a variety of 
discursive devices (see Middleton & Edwards, 1990). 
 
The Chancellor’s Memory paper builds on the work of Middleton & Edwards by 
refining the focus. In the edited volume, Collective Remembering, a fairly wide-
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ranging agenda had been set out that included themes such as the ‘social practice 
of commemoration’, the ‘social foundation and context of individual memory’ 
and ‘social institutional remembering and forgetting’. These themes are fairly 
marginal to Edwards & Potter (1992), who concentrate instead on the wholesale 
‘bracketing out’ of subjectivity and experience, along with the methods of 
experimental psychology. If the earlier work had implied that discourse analysis 
and pragmatics expanded the toolkit of psychology, here Edwards & Potter were 
clear that it was instead intended to replace them: 
 
[I]n any account of conversational remembering, what is required is not 
merely an extension of traditional cognitive concerns into real-world 
settings, but a re-focusing of attention upon the dynamics of social action, 
and in particular, of discourse. (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 188) 
 
The argument turns upon an initial critique of Ulrich Neisser’s (1981) paper on 
‘John Dean’s Memory’. Neisser’s career, like that of Jerome Bruner, straddled the 
emergence of cognitive psychology in the 1970s. Both had been trained in the 
heady mix of Gestalt psychology and perceptual research and had arrived at the 
conclusion, contra the dominant behaviourist paradigm, that it was necessary to 
study ‘thinking’ as an active, reflexive force in shaping human action rather than 
the residual echo left by stimulus-response chains. As Graham Richards (2010) 
and Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2000) have shown, it is difficult for us to now properly 
appreciate just how radical information theory and cybernetics was to ‘pre-
cognitive’ psychologists. Notions such as feedback loops and signal/noise 
pairings made it possible to envisage a psychological subject embedded in an 
informational ecology in which she or he could operate as an active agent. 
However, it is to Neisser’s very great credit that, despite having drawn together 
the implications of information theory for a Cognitive Psychology, he later came 
to see (as did Bruner) the limitations of the dogmatism of the ‘standard model’ of 
cognitive processes that had initially formulated. 
 
In the 1981 paper, published in Cognition: The international journal of Cognitive 
Science, Neisser is performing a rather delicate act. He is, in effect, telling an 
audience of committed cognitive-experimentalists that they have been getting 
something very important wrong. Because they have studied memory solely in 
laboratory settings, they have blinded themselves to the complexity of how 
memory actually functions in daily life: 
 
In a psychological experiment, it is relatively easy to determine whether 
what the subject says is true. The experimenter knows what really 
happened because she staged it in the first place, or because she kept a 
record with which the subject’s report can be compared. Because life does 
not keep such records, legal testimony is usually evaluated in more 
indirect ways: corroborative witnesses, cross-examination, circumstantial 
evidence. For some of Dean’s testimony, however, it is now possible to 
compare what he said with a factual record: the Presidential Transcripts. 
This comparison will enable us to assess the accuracy of his memory 
rather precisely. In addition, it may clarify our theoretical conceptions of 
memory itself. (Neisser, 1981: 2) 
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This passage is interpretatively rich. Neisser contrasts what happens inside the 
laboratory with what happens outside of it (i.e. the vast majority of human 
experience). Experimentalists are correct to be confident in the findings of 
memory experiments, he states, because they have ‘staged’ events in such as way 
as to have a clear point of comparison. But outside of the laboratory, this is 
simply not possible. However, all is not lost! Sometimes institutions create 
records of their own which may act in ways analogous to experimental practices. 
If the audience is willing to hear, Neisser will go on to demonstrate just what can 
be done if one cares to look closely at these records.  
 
In this invitation to follow him ‘outside the laboratory’, Neisser simultaneously 
flatters and entices his audience. At the time he was already a grandee figure in 
the discipline, a world-renowned figure and founder of the paradigm in which 
the audience were deeply embedded. But he was also a figure who had become, 
suddenly and unexpectedly, rather controversial. Three years earlier, Neisser 
had attempted to engage this same audience of hardcore cognitivists with rather 
less enticing statement - ‘If X is an interesting or socially important aspect of 
memory, then psychologists have hardly ever studied X’ (Neisser, 1978: 4). The 
1981 passage needs to be alongside the 1978 statement. By the time of John 
Dean’s Memory, Neisser has blown a great deal of his professional capital, he can 
no longer demand his audience’s attention, he has instead to work to whet their 
appetite with a taster of what might await them if they were prepared to 
suspend their prejudices. 
 
This is not the way that Edwards & Potter (1992) read Neisser’s invitation. They 
take it as demonstration that whilst he is making a ‘significant and welcome 
departure’ (p.189), in the end a leopard never really changes its spots. He 
remains fixated on the idea that it is, somehow, possible to establish the ‘truth’ of 
what happened, and thereby assess the veridicality of what is remembered. The 
alternative analysis that Edwards & Potter (1992) conduct is developed first in 
relation to John Dean’s testimony and then further fleshed out using the 
‘Lawsongate’ example. Their key argument is that throughout his testimony, 
‘Dean’s truth is indistinguishable from his mode of accounting’ (p.194). The 
various claims he makes around what he can and cannot remember and the way 
in which he organizes his accounts of the meetings with Nixon are treated as 
rhetorically organized to attend to the ongoing interactional pragmatics of the 
hearings. Edwards & Potter make a very compelling case that variation in the 
accounts that Dean offers – sometimes appearing to make ‘verbatim’ recall, at 
other times decrying that his ‘mind is not a tape recorder’ – can be understood as 
contextually occasioned. In building this argument, Edwards & Potter draw 
support from Molotch & Boden’s (1985) work, which focused on a different set 
of data to that used by Neisser, made of up of transcripts of the hearing Dean 
attended where he was questioned by a US Senator widely considered to be 
‘Nixon’s man’, who was as a consequence hearably antagonistic towards Dean.  
Neisser is then seen as having only ‘half the story’. 
 
The Lawsongate material gets a very similar treatment, although one which 
probably benefits from the cultural knowledge that Edwards & Potter bring to 
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the material (e.g. how the Parliamentary ‘lobby’ system works; background 
knowledge on the political fortunes of the ruling Conservative Party). One of the 
key aspects to the analysis is how the issue of the ‘missing tape’ is treated in the 
exchanges. Here there is apparently no possibility of establishing a ‘bottom line’ 
account of ‘the truth of what happened’. Edwards & Potter thus demonstrate that 
pragmatically oriented claims to ‘truth’ are central resources to the unfolding of 
social action, rather than matters that lay in the hands of the analyst. Here we see 
an empirical working through of what would come to be, for a time, a very 
particular preoccupation in Discursive Psychology – the absence of ‘bottom line’ 
accounts – which would go on to be developed in its own right in Death and 
Furniture. 
 
A number of other stylistic and methodological details of the piece are worth 
remarking on here. The analysis is initially framed with the three themes of 
‘function’, ‘variation’ and ‘construction’. This loose framing of the way that 
discourse works is found in both Discourse and Social Psychology and Collective 
Remembering, before becoming superseded by the more tightly organized 
Discourse Action Model (DAM) in Discursive Psychology. Whether or not the 
apocryphal story is correct that DAM was created to satisfy the demands of the 
reviewers of Edwards & Potter’s Psychological Review piece (‘where’s the damn 
theory then?’), it seems reasonable to suppose that nascent Discursive 
Psychology became more formalized as a consequence of the effort to 
communicate the approach to a cognitive-experimental audience. The 
Chancellor’s Memory is, after all, published in the journal Applied Cognitive 
Psychology – the first and last time its avid readers were offered such a 
methodological joyride outside the laboratory, we imagine. 
 
What Happened Next 
 
The response to the effort made in The Chancellor’s Memory to engage with the 
cognitive-experimental community can best be gauged by looking at the 
published commentaries to an invited paper that Edwards, Middleton and Potter 
contributed to The Psychologist. The Edwards et al (1992) piece opens by 
repeating many of the objections to the laboratory study of memory discussed by 
Middleton & Edwards (1990) and Edwards & Potter (1992), before briefly 
summarizing recent work at Loughborough using DAM as a guide. The tone is 
interesting. If Neisser, in John Dean’s Memory, attempts to lure psychologists 
from the laboratory with the promise of the delights in store outside, Edwards et 
al are telling cognitive-experimentalists that their jobs have been outsourced to 
more effective workers and they might as well leave the laboratory before it is 
closed down. Unsurprisingly, the responses range from the nonplussed to barely 
restrained fury. Some reject discursive work on the grounds that is simply 
unscientific: 
 
If you cast your lot in with the empiricists in the seventeenth century, and 
feel a thrill at trouncing the rationalists, then the study of memory in the 
twentieth century impose a simple criterion to determine the truth of a 
hypothesis: systematic, controlled observation yielding replicable results. 
Can discourse analysis provide such data? (Banaji, 1992: 448).  
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On this count, Discursive Psychology does not meet the bar for an empirical 
science. But the argument is reversed by Roediger & Wheeler, who see a 
potential ‘gold mine’ of data but with very little theoretical coherence: 
 
we have tried several times to comprehend the nine tenets of DAM … but … 
fear that we have failed. The model seems so general that is excludes nothing 
… At one point in our efforts to understand discursive remembering we 
looked up discursive in the Oxford American Dictionary (1980) and were 
informed discursive means ‘rambling from one subject to another’. Just so. 
(Roediger & Wheeler, 1992: 453) 
 
These two arguments – Discursive Psychology as neither sufficiently empirical 
nor convincingly theoretical – would be repeated time after time in the coming 
decades. And the response would eventually harden into a mantra: Discursive 
Psychology is rigorously empirical, but the nature of this rigor exceeds the 
narrow and naïve definitions of scientificity used by cognitive-experimentalists 
(e.g. Edwards, 2012); Discursive Psychology rejects ungrounded theorizing, 
instead producing descriptions of the pervasive features of social life that are 
superior to mere conceptual deduction (e.g. Potter, 2012a).  
 
One further response is worth considering. Alan Baddeley – the Godfather of 
British psychology of memory – asks whether discursive work properly concerns 
memory at all: 
 
What emerges then is that the authors are interested in the social 
interaction between members of groups, and its verbal expressions, and 
that find remembering a useful topic for generating such interaction. 
Hardly a model of memory, but potentially a very interesting topic. 
(Baddeley, 1992: 447) 
 
We might see this simply as Baddeley displaying his displeasure at the lack of 
respect he and his work had been shown by these upstarts whose names were 
barely known in the hallowed circles of the Experimental Psychological Society – 
‘In conclusion then, while I do not propose to give up cognitive psychology, I am 
intrigued to know what Dr Edwards and his colleagues have been finding out 
about groups reminiscing’ (p.448). But he also has a point. The Chancellor’s 
Memory, along with the Edwards et al (1992) piece, is not, strictly speaking 
about ‘memory’ at all. It is an attempt to show how the subject matter parsed by 
cognitive psychology can be lifted wholesale into a discursive approach. This will 
be the long-term project of Discursive Psychology – setting out a way of doing 
Psychology as the study of the discursive practices in which ‘mental life’ is 
rendered operant in the pragmatics of communication. As Edwards & Potter 
(1992) conclude: 
 
Our recommendation is to let go of a commitment to mind as a pre-
existing, independently knowable explanation of talk and action … Like 
the ‘truth’, the cognitions that are thought to apprehend and distort it are 
also researchable as discursive formulations, as versions of mental life, 
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framed in talk and text, and oriented to the pragmatics of communication. 
The study of how conceptualizations of cognitive processes are deployed 
in everyday and scientific discourses will be a major focus of further 
work. (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 211) 
 
Even if one is sympathetic to what is being said here (as indeed we are!), it is 
difficult to see what purpose is served by ‘recommending’ to cognitive-
experimentalists that they ‘let go’ of the paradigmatic basis on which their 
intellectual commitments, and indeed careers, are formed. Everything we know 
about paradigms, since Kuhn (1962), suggests that communities of researchers 
are not simply persuaded into new modes of working, they are reluctantly forced 
to do so when the groundswell of evidence makes current practices untenable. 
Interestingly, in the decade that separates John Dean’s Memory from The 
Chancellor’s Memory, a movement had begun – the ‘everyday memory’ tradition 
(Conway, 1991) – that is now, arguably, building to the kind of groundswell that 
might bring about the sort of conceptual re-orientation that Edwards & Potter 
called for. It was within this emergent body of work that Neisser rebuilt his 
reputation after the 1978 comments (Neisser, 1982; Fivush & Neisser, 1994).  
 
It is unclear what, if anything, is gained in epistemic terms by making 
unequivocal assertions about what is and what is not to be properly called 
‘Psychology’ given the diverse and complex historical emergence of the 
discipline. But Baddeley’s barb that that Discursive Psychology has no ‘model of 
memory’ does stick. To treat remembering as primarily researchable in terms of 
the interactional formulation of descriptions and claims about the past is to miss 
what is, for all of us, a crucial aspect of ‘memory’. We all feel a connection 
between what we are doing now and our personal and collective histories. That 
felt connection, which we might gloss as a ‘flow of experience’, is a critical 
resource that we all draw upon in making sense of any given interaction. Whilst 
it most certainly does not drive how we ‘frame versions of mental life in talk and 
text’ in any causal way, and most definitely is not adequately grasped with the 
kinds of ‘models of memory’ associated with Baddeley, the flow of experience is a 
significant issue for any putative psychology of memory. 
 
Critique 
 
In this last section, we want to begin by pointing to a division within Discursive 
Psychology that occurs around the publication of The Chancellor’s Memory. 
Following the reception of Collective Remembering, Dave Middleton signed a 
contract with the publisher, Sage, to author a research monograph, provisionally 
entitled Social Remembering, by 1992. As is the way with such projects, there 
was some drift in the timeline... In fact, the book was not published until many 
years later, in 2005, with a different title The Social Psychology of Experience, and 
with one of us attached as a co-author.  
 
Why did it take so long to complete this book? If one reads the second half of the 
Edwards et al (1992) piece, there are various indications of what Social 
Remembering might have looked like, had it been completed as planned. It would 
most likely have focused on remembering as a process for producing collectivity 
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or ‘communities of memory’ through a work of ‘becoming members again’ (‘re-
membering’). Middleton would come to describe this process as the 
interdependency of the individual and the collective (see Middleton, 2002). By 
this he meant that it was analytically important to keep a hold of the notion of 
‘the individual’, but just not in the way that cognitive-experimental psychology 
had come to define it. This concern with personhood had, he felt, been jettisoned 
by Discursive Psychology in its move to ‘let go’ of the philosophical and 
operational difficulties implied by the concept of ‘mind’.  
 
In order to explain why Middleton felt this was important, we have to consider 
where the project of ‘letting go of mind’ has gone since in Discursive Psychology. 
Potter’s (2012b) short commentary on Creswell (2012) provides a good 
summary. In this piece, Potter responds to the resurgent interest in the term 
‘experience’ in contemporary social science. He cites the later Wittgenstein’s 
(1958) classic argument on thinking as language as having sufficiently addressed 
all relevant philosophical matters, and then details a range of foreboding 
methodological issues that confront the researcher who is nevertheless 
determined to find a means of engaging with experience as an extra-discursive 
matter. Particularly ire is (justly) reserved for ‘Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis’ (IPA) (see Smith et al, 2009), which is seen as ducking the issue entirely 
by conflating talk about mental states with these states themselves. Discursive 
Psychologists, by contrast, start with ‘practices and people acting in relation to 
one another, and bracket off issues of cognition’ (p.577). In detailing these 
difficulties, Potter performs himself as somewhat exasperated by ‘a common but 
unnecessary nostalgia for a more classic form of ‘interiority’’  (p.586). This he 
names as either ‘dualism’ or ‘cognitivism’.  The alternative is to respecify 
psychological categories as interactionally occasioned descriptions made in 
particular communicative settings. He finds himself incredulous that  ‘even after 
some 20 years since the publication of Discursive Psychology … researchers of all 
flavours still have difficulties in accommodating this radical move’ (p. 577). 
 
But what is the nature of this ‘radical move’? It consists of reifying the very 
dualism it seeks to unpick. If there is something called ‘experience’ that differs 
from discursive practice, then, the argument goes, it can only be located in the 
‘interior’ realm of the Cartesian subject. Cognition is either a discursive matter or 
an ‘in-the-head’ matter (in which case it is probably either inaccessible or 
uninteresting and can be safely bracketed out). This is a version of cognition that 
is not altogether recognizable to contemporary cognitive science. The ‘extended 
mind’ hypothesis of Clark & Chalmers (1998), for example, applies the term 
‘cognition’ to activities that occur ‘outside the head’ as well as ‘inside’. John 
Sutton and colleagues have developed ‘distributed cognition’ approaches to 
social remembering that point to the crucial role of material mediators such as 
diaries or electronic devices (Sutton et al, 2010). Recent work in ‘enactive’ and 
‘embodied’ cognition aims at pushing further at the boundaries between self and 
world to see thinking as fundamentally a matter of doing (Colombetti, 2014). 
And in contemporary philosophy, the displacement of cognition from a Cartesian 
version of mind continues apace with the renewed interest in the process 
philosophies of AN Whitehead (1985) and Henri Bergson (1991).  
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The issue here is that there is nothing terribly radical at all about the move of 
respecifying the psychological in interactional terms (as Ian Hacking 1999 once 
noted in relation to Coulter’s work).The impact of post-dualist approaches such 
as Actor-Network Theory and the double whammy of Foucauldian and Deleuzian 
philosophies as the metaphysics of choice for social scientists who see 
themselves on the cutting edge, has left contemporary work completely 
unfettered by any notion of interiority across vast swathes of Sociology, Human 
Geography, Cultural Theory, Management Studies, International Relations, 
Science and Technology Studies … and the list goes on. Discursive Psychologists 
are really pushing at an open door outside of the discipline with arguments such 
as the following: 
 
Clearly language, or discourse, is not all that there is in the world, not all 
that psychology and society are made of, and not the same thing as 
experience, or reality, or feelings, or knowledge. It is just language, 
discourse, or talk-in- interaction: not those other things. But it is the 
primary work of language to make all those ‘other’ phenomena accountable 
(Edwards, 2006: 42) . 
 
Few readers of outlets such as, say, Environment and Planning D: Society & Space 
or Journal of Cultural Economy would find anything here objectionable. In fact 
they might very well see themselves as taking a similar tack in their own 
empirical work, namely getting at ‘psychology’ or ‘society’ through the 
interactional work through which these things are constituted. And this brings 
us the central problem. Given the spread of post-dualist thinking across the 
social sciences, what is it exactly that makes Discursive Psychology particularly 
‘psychological’? Or put another way, if discourse is ‘not the same thing’ as 
‘experience’ or ‘feelings’, then whose task is it to explore this difference in a post-
cognitive framework if not psychologists? Why keep strictly to the project of 
purifying any extra-discursive conception of subjectivity, experience or mind 
from a psychology of memory? 
 
In a curious way, Edwards & Potter seem to have swapped places with Neisser. 
Where the latter once appeared to be attempting to prolong an ageing paradigm 
beyond its natural lifespan by proposing a move outside the laboratory, it is 
Potter who now claims that the increasing focus on naturalistic data in 
Discursive Psychology ‘promotes innovative analyses, pushes researchers off 
well-worn social science agendas, and promotes powerful leverage for real-life 
problems and issues’ (2012b: 577). If Neisser seemed to be suggesting that there 
was little that cognitivism could not explain, then Potter appears to be currently 
attracted to the same position – ‘Despite the burgeoning evidence of supposed 
‘phenomenological’ research, it is not clear that any other perspective provides 
as nuanced an account of psychological matters as they are threaded through 
people’s lives and provides a more systematic, rigorous and repeatable analysis’ 
(2012b: 586). This last phrase is particularly striking. Discursive Psychology has 
its roots in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, a discipline that was acutely 
aware of the vacuous nature of claims to ‘systematicity’, ‘rigor’, and most 
notoriously ‘replication’ (see Ashmore, 1989; Collins, 1992; Gilbert & Mulkay, 
1984). To see these terms repeated here without any apparent irony, is most 
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peculiar (compare with Edwards et al, 1992: 454).  
 
The main thrust of Edwards & Potter’s (1992) critique of Neisser is that he treats 
the Presidential Transcripts as a ‘bottom line’ against which the veridicality of 
Dean’s testimony can be established. But what are we to make of the centrality of 
the methodological drive towards more ‘systematic’ and ‘rigorous’ data 
collection in current Discursive Psychology, where only recorded ‘naturalistic 
data’ is deemed adequate for analytic purposes, and other forms of data are 
dismissed as ‘got up’ (see Potter, 2012b)? Ashmore et al (2004) refer to this as 
‘tape fetishism’ – the idea that the tape functions as a kind of time machine that 
transports the analyst back to ‘where the action is’ and thereby serves as hotline 
to getting in touch with the ‘richness’ and ‘intricacies’ of actual people interacting 
with each other in real time’ (Potter, 2012b: 448). If the psychology of memory is 
arguably at its strongest when it entertains methodological pluralism and makes 
a concerted effort to constructively engage with analytic and epistemic 
differences, in precisely the manner that Edwards & Potter (1992) asked of their 
readers, then the spirit of early cognitivism, its dream that the difficult questions 
around the psychological were simply methodological issues to be overcome by 
better techniques, lives on proudly in contemporary Discursive Psychology. 
Neisser, at least, thought there was a way out of his laboratory. 
 
And that is why, we think, Middleton never published the planned version of 
Social Remembering. He came to appreciate that the difficulties of constituting a 
genuinely social approach to the psychology of memory involved more than 
purely technical questions. The kind of analysis required, whilst still grounded in 
the evidential base supplied by ‘the tape’, could not be reduced to its re-
description, in the same way that his earlier work on ‘scaffolding’ could not be 
hung entirely on experimental data. In his work after the Edwards et al (1992) 
piece, Middleton engaged with sociocultural psychology, an area where his many 
contributions continue to be celebrated (e.g. Middleton, 1997; 2002). He found 
here an intellectual project where memory was not treated as an arbitrary term 
for marking certain kinds of descriptive practices, but instead referred to 
substantive human activities for making use of the past in the present, and 
connected together important figures in the discipline, such as Bartlett and 
Vygotsky. Curiously, sociocultural psychology also offers a connection back to 
Neisser’s work, through the ‘sociocultural model of autobiographical memory’ 
formulated by his former colleague, Robyn Fivush (Fivush et al, 2011). It turns 
out that the meeting of cognitivism with discourse analysis announced by 
Edwards & Potter ended up taking place elsewhere. 
 
The book Middleton did eventually publish, The Social Psychology of Experience, 
was yet another turn. The problem of how to think continuity and 
interdependence, how we turn around on the past in the present, is thought 
through Bergson, Halbwachs & Bartlett. Whilst there is ample transcribed data to 
be found throughout, theory is used to ‘amplify’ and transform what is on the 
tape to situate a given interaction in an account of a broader flow of experience. 
That text was one of the points of departure for our own current work (Brown & 
Reavey, 2015), where we argue that in the case of difficult or distressing 
experiences, it is incorrect to assert that there a multitude of possible versions of 
To appear in C. Tileaga & E. Stokoe (Eds) (2015) Discursive Psychology: Classic and Contemporary 
Issues. London: Routledge. 
 11 
events that are interactionally available to survivors. It seems to us that the 
problem is rather that persons feel ‘locked into’ very specific versions of events. 
However, the dynamics of memory in play are broadly distributed across 
relationships, institutions, material affordances and – of course – discursive 
practices. What interests us is developing ‘post-cognitive’ accounts of 
remembering that nevertheless does not deny that we have a felt connection to 
our past that shapes the versions of events we are able to muster.  
 
We are not alone in wanting to expand the ‘rich surface’ of human conduct 
around memory that is so celebrated by Edwards and Potter to include ‘extra-
discursive’ matters. Kyoko Murakami’s (2012) work has begun to explore how a 
re-thinking of temporality impacts on an interactional analysis of remembering. 
Lucas Bietti (2014) in involved in an audacious project to connect discursive 
approaches to memory with cognitive and linguistic models. David Kaposi 
(2011) has sketched out a view of the psychology of memory as a ‘political and 
moral science’ based on a re-reading of Edwards & Potter (1992). And closer still 
to home, Cristian Tileagã’s (2009; 2011) ongoing research is mobilizing a 
concept of ideology in relation to the joint-construction of the biographical and 
the historical. Much as we appreciate the purist connoisseurship of the way 
Discursive Psychology handles the ‘exquisite’, ‘intricate’ and ‘rich’ conversational 
practices that are – of course! – at work in remembering, we find these searching 
explorations of the messy and dirty meshwork of discursive and extra-discursive 
relations more to our taste.  
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